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Abstract 
The present study investigated the causes of football hooliganism and the pre-
liminaries, the tragic events and stadium disasters of the last few decades, which 
called the attention of those involved in securing these events to the fact that the 
existing practices had to be changed and that the creation of new legal norms 
was necessary. The paper showcases the significant statements in Taylor’s re-
ports, which were adapted in the practice of securing events in Hungary, too. 
Taylor established that there was not one method for the management of crowd 
behaviour that could provide complete safety and, instead of focusing on the 
policing issue, he moved towards an ‘integrated’, ‘holistic’ approach. He real-
ised that it was both impractical and impossible to stop football fans solely by 
criminal law measures and thought that communication with the clubs and fans, 
as well as with the media should be developed. All his proposals have now been 
implemented. Those securing sports events have been trying to ensure order as 
a basic value of society ever since his ideas were published.
Keywords: sports policing, sports event, football hooliganism, Taylor, crowd 
psychology, admission
Introduction
In an earlier study I have formulated the idea that sports policing is a specific part 
of sports administration. It can be interpreted in narrow terms and clearly defined 
as a special field of policing. A range of laws provides for everything related to 
sports policing, supplemented by regulations issued by the specific associations, 
which serve as directions concerning both keeping sports policing records and 
securing sports events (Tóth, 2016, 292.). In the present paper I seek answers 
to the following questions: What are the reasons for football hooliganism? 
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What preliminaries, disasters in various stadiums have happened in the last few 
decades that focused the attention of those involved in securing events on the 
fact that the existing practices had to be changed and that the creation of new 
legal instruments was necessary? Since it is a well-known fact that order is of 
basic value for every society, and those involved in securing sports events need 
to make all the efforts in order to provide it, even though, unfortunately, perfect 
safety cannot be guaranteed. Safety must be given as a service, the main pur-
pose of which is to prevent disturbances. In order to get to the roots of football 
hooliganism, we need to learn about the history of its development and also the 
analysis of crowd psychology and that of the supporters attending the stadiums 
is essential. Stadiums also have special acoustics, which enhance the extraor-
dinary atmosphere of matches with the help of various technical devices (loud 
music and enormous projectors). When a lot of people are crammed together in 
a confined space, even the smallest wrongdoing may become fatal (Tóth, 2017, 
13.). The individual is dissolved in the crowd and is released from social con-
trol. The fans feel that they are anonymous. Since they are driven by the same 
emotions, striking slogans have an intense impact on them and incite powerful 
emotions in them. Their individuality ceases to exist; in the crowd they become 
one and are overwhelmed by passion. The theory developed by Gustave Le Bon 
discusses the phenomenon of crowd psychology. Its main finding is that the in-
dividual loses himself in the crowd (Csepeli, 2001, 157.).
The development of football hooliganism
In the first half of the 20th century soccer was considered a gentleman’s sport that 
had regard for fair play. Consequently, its habitual visitors were middle-class 
people. The roots of violence among spectators go back to folk football in Me-
dieval England. The behaviour known as football hooliganism emerged in the 
UK in 1960. In other western European countries, such as Italy, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Belgium the phenomenon developed only 10 years later. In 
those times clothes search, for example, was still carried out only superficially, 
the police in the stadiums were understaffed, the chief of police responsible for 
order in the section did not ask for help in time and the fans were not segregat-
ed properly. The disturbance after the National Championship 1 (professional 
league, NB I) soccer match of 10 March 1990 between Váci Izzó and Ferencváros 
(FTC) is usually mentioned as the event during which the phenomenon of foot-
ball hooliganism started in Hungary. Earlier, in the 1970s and 1980s there had 
already been adverse manifestations by fans, mainly at matches of the teams 
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FTC and Újpest. Then the Minister of Children, Youth and Sport Affairs asked 
a committee to evaluate the state of affairs. The investigation established that 
football hooliganism is a complex social issue that cannot be remedied merely 
by policing tools. Using the report, the contemporary government developed 
an action programme and on its basis the government decree 1071/2003. (VII. 
18.) was accepted, which defined the specific tasks to be carried out by the vari-
ous ministries, including deadlines and persons in charge. In 2006, based on the 
research done by the National Institute of Criminology it was clear that there 
was a lack of efficient sanctions; banning fans from matches was not a func-
tioning legal institution. There were no access control systems, and the sports 
facilities were also in poor technical condition. It was already established at that 
time that football hooliganism could only be combatted with the cooperation 
of all the actors of Hungarian soccer and of the police, an important element of 
which should be a continuous dialogue and consistent compliance with the leg-
islation (Nagy, 2006, 118-134.). In the 1990s a joint research programme was 
conducted together with CEPOL. In the framework of studying mass events, 
the lessons learnt about access control systems and forward-thinking proposals 
were shared among police experts, which also had a great impact on the princi-
ples of securing events. Going back to the preliminaries, we can sadly establish 
that since the Second World War 1500 people have been killed in more than 60 
stadium disasters, which turned the stadiums into hell. The case in 1964 is re-
corded as one of the most devastating events, in which 318 people were killed 
in Lima, after a match between Peru and Argentina. The police used tear gas 
against the fans, who tried to escape but the exits of the stadium were locked 
up. Apart from the 318 fatalities more than 500 people were seriously injured. 
A rash police attack in Ghana in 2001 ended with the death of 127 people. The 
people in the panicked crowd fell over each other as they wanted to get out, but 
most gates were closed at this event, too. 93 people lost their lives under bizarre 
circumstances in Nepal in 1988, when an enormous hailstorm hit the stadium in 
the middle of a Nepal – Bangladesh match. The spectators tried to escape, but, 
for some unknown reason, the police kept and turned the crowd back and the 
people crushed each other to death. In 1985 a dropped cigarette-end caused a 
fire, which reduced one of the terraces of the stadium in Bradford, UK to ashes. 
The police had to drive the spectators to the field but even so, the tragedy was 
unavoidable, resulting in 56 fatalities. An interesting fact is connected to the 
above, namely that in the Staff Regulations issued for the Police by the Hun-
garian Ministry of Interior, it was pointed out already in 1948:  ̒Smoking is pro-
hibited on the wooden grandstands (terraces) of sports and race grounds. The 
audience’s attention must be drawn to this ban with the help of signs posted in 
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prominent places.’ In Scotland there were two disasters. In one of them, due to 
heavy rains, the newly constructed wooden grandstand drenched through and 
collapsed during a match. Several hundreds of fans fell down and 25 did not 
survive. The decree adopted after this case stipulated that stadiums in the terri-
tory of the UK must be built from reinforced concrete. The worst sports disas-
ter in Russia took place in Moscow in 1982. The leadership of the Lenin Stadi-
um decided to open only the western and eastern terraces, these being the only 
clean ones after a heavy snowfall a few days before. Some people fell over the 
barriers, taking several others with them. This domino effect caused the death 
of 66 spectators (Kocsis, 1986, 21-22.).
A few more data on panic resulting in disasters: 
25 people were killed and 517 injured in Glasgow, in 1902, where in 1971 
there were 66 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. We know about 120 injured 
during the Firenze – Juventus match in Turin in 1957. Ten people died and more 
than 100 were injured in Kirikhala, Turkey in 1906. A match in Buenos Aires in 
1968 led to 80 fatalities. 33 casualties and 400 injured were reported in Bolton 
in 1946. October 1956, Naples: 65 people injured. December 1964, Istanbul, 
Turkey – Bulgaria match: 84 seriously injured, due to panic. 1964, Turkey: 27 
fatalities and 600 injured after a clash with the police. 1968, Buenos Aires: 80 
dead and 150 people injured at a River Plate – Boca Juniors match. Congo, 1969: 
27 dead and 52 injured, due to panic within the audience. April 1977, Hamburg: 
1 dead, 25 injured at the Hamburger SV – Bayern München match. June 1977: 
only three months after the previous case, 70 injured again at the Hamburger SV 
– Bayern München match. At the Zamalek– Dukla Praha match in 1974 several 
hundred people were injured and 48 were killed. 1981, Piraeus: 21 dead and 54 
injured at the Olympiacos Piraeus – AEK Athens championship game. November 
1982, Cali: 24 fatalities and 50 injured at the America – Deportivo champion-
ship game. November 1982, Algiers: 8 people died and 600 were injured when 
a terrace collapsed during the championship match of the local team. May 1985, 
Beijing: vandalism and clash between the police forces and the fans, several 
dozens of injured and arrested people after the 2:1 defeat by Hong Kong (Ko-
csis, 1986, 22.). Wednesday 29 May 1985, Brussels, Heysel Stadium, European 
Cup Final between Juventus and Liverpool: The two teams were accompanied 
by several tens of thousands of home supporters, who had arrived in the capital 
of Belgium by air, ship, train and car, more than 30 of them never to return to 
their homes, due to a group of drunken and careless British supporters, who at-
tacked the Italians. Escaping from the raving Britons, the panicked crowd was 
pushed back against a brick wall, which collapsed. Many of the people fell down, 
after which the remaining part of the wall collapsed onto them. Incidentally, at 
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that time sports events in Brussels were secured by experienced, practised or-
ganisers. The Belgian minister of the interior had alerted the gendarmerie, the 
police, the fire brigade and the ambulance before this match. More than 3.000 
police officers were securing the stadium and the whole law enforcement ma-
chinery of the city was on standby. There were 7 ambulances and a medical li-
aison car on the premises, as well as 200 English police officers to help their 
Belgian colleagues. The entrances of the stadium were opened at 5 p.m., three 
hours before the match, which was planned to begin at 8.15 p.m. The clothes of 
the spectators were searched in only a superficial way, as the fans were eager to 
get in fast. The Heysel tragedy was clearly caused by football hooliganism, re-
sulting in the death of 39, mainly Italian supporters. Many people think soccer 
died that day. That is what The Times also declared the following day, taking a 
very strong stance against football hooligans. I believe that, after this incident, 
due to the significant changes, the whole industry of soccer was reborn from 
its own ashes, to become one of the most profitable businesses in a short period 
of time. Beginning from the mid-1960s, the majority of the spectators at foot-
ball matches was gradually made up of those living on casual work and social 
benefits. The latest research, however, shows that the ratio of those who never 
go to such matches is the highest among those who completed only 8 years of 
primary education or even less. My findings have confirmed the same. In the 
first half of the 1990s in Hungary it was only the police that took an active role 
in managing this negative phenomenon in sport. A standing committee was set 
up to review the infrastructural requirements and to update the security plans 
of the contemporary People’s Stadium. It must be highlighted that the Crowd 
Management Division of the National Police Headquarters has been running a 
National Football Information Point to manage intelligence related to threats to 
security since 2003. Going back in the Hungarian history of football atrocities, 
we should mention events like the one in 1921 at an MTK – Kispest match at 
the stadium in Üllői road, Budapest, when a referee was beaten with a knuckle 
duster until he passed out or the match in 1922, which the chief commissioner 
of the national police ordered to be held with the public excluded. In 1937 at 
a FTC – Debrecen match 2000 fans were stopped by 14 equestrian and 10 pe-
destrian police patrol officers. In 1947 a match between the Hungarian and the 
Austrian elected teams almost ended in a disaster. The fans were celebrating 
the 50th anniversary of Hungarian football at the sports ground of the FTC in 
Üllői road. More than 40 thousand people were crammed on the wooden ter-
races designed for fewer people, whose 8-metre section collapsed, resulting in 
about 200 fans falling down. At the beginning of the 2000s, acts qualifying as 
football hooliganism or vandalism and brawls between fans already occurred 
82
in higher numbers. By that time, it had become quite clear that securing pub-
lic order was necessary not only on the terraces but also before, and, more im-
portantly, after the matches  (Kolláth, 2003, 40.). On 30th May 2003, after the 
match at the stadium of the FTC in Üllői road, Budapest, a riot broke out among 
the spectators. It is almost unbelievable but there were no fatalities this time, 
either. The most seriously injured person, a young man suffered vertebral and 
cranial fractures. (He became disabled for all his life and later was employed 
by FTC. He was a cashier for 25 years and was even given accommodation in 
the Club’s headquarters in Üllői road.) On the same day there were atrocities 
in Siófok between the fans of the teams of two towns. 
The Taylor Report
Lord Justice Peter Taylor worked together with a committee and carried out a 
detailed analysis of the Hillsborough disaster in 1989. His recommendations, 
for example the establishment of all-seating stadiums without perimeters, rad-
ically changed the image of modern British (and later European) soccer. In his 
Report, Taylor examines not only stadiums but also the facilities of many other 
sports. However, he clearly establishes that the most important task is to ensure 
the safety of football stadiums, on the one hand because football can be consid-
ered the sport of the nation and, on the other hand, because it moves the largest 
crowds. He considers overcrowding the greatest threat and his investigations 
showed that disasters also resulted from outdated stadiums, poor facilities, hoo-
liganism, excessive drinking and poor management. In the present paper I wish 
to present the practical elements of the Taylor Report and its influence on the 
securing of sports events, taking into consideration the Hungarian practice and 
comparing the underlying principles. In Hungary there have been no fatalities 
related to sports events. Before the change of the political system, in a society 
under strict control, disorderly acts rarely occurred on the terraces and around 
the sports fields. Even the chants were more mannerly. Since the change in the 
political system, violent acts among the audience at sports fields have become 
more frequent. Today the mass media do not keep silent about such events, ei-
ther, although their reports are often about scoop hunting and written in tab-
loid style. Unfortunately, violence has become a form of spending one’s spare 
time. A professional committee led by MP Zoltán Páva studied the experience 
and lessons gained from the already mentioned, 2003 riots in Üllői road. Their 
findings, often referred to as the Hungarian Taylor Report were issued on 12th 
July 2003. The committee established that football hooliganism had been han-
Nikolett Ágnes Tóth: Thoughts about 
the current issues of sports policing
Belügyi Szemle / 2020 / Special Issue 3. 83
dled almost exclusively as a policing problem. The Report wanted to find the 
most important lessons and similarities that could be found with the Taylor Re-
port and to reveal the new, modern security philosophy and the important legal 
measures needed. It also sought answers to questions such as: What results can 
be expected from the application of technological solutions? To what extent are 
the problems football-specific? (Kolláth, 2003, 41.)
Based on the study report on the events related to the demonstrations, street 
riots and public order measures in Budapest in September-October 2006, we 
can state that in the mid-2000s soccer matches were frequented by fewer and 
fewer real fans and consequently the terraces were less occupied by football 
hooligans, too. Between 2003 and 2006 there were 23 cases when the riot po-
lice had to intervene in stadiums. The aforementioned professional committee 
was already set up in 2003 to investigate football hooliganism. It established 
that the state of sports security was not satisfactory and that after a scandal the 
responsible persons or organisations had only been found in exceptional cases. 
Between 1992 and 2002, vandalism led to riots in 46 cases, resulting in seri-
ous damage at the matches or in the surrounding areas, including wrecking the 
means of transport and shops on the hooligans’ way or harassing and hurting 
passers-by. Of course, at that time large-scale violence and supporting football 
teams were not necessarily related. The member states of the Council of Europe 
agreed on the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour 
at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches on 19 August 1985. The 
basic principles of this Convention were also incorporated in the Hungarian 
Act on Sport (2004). That was why the committee proposed that the limits of 
liability of the organisers of sports events should be clearly defined. It was nec-
essary to make it clear that the police should only take part in securing sports 
events and in restoring public order for the purpose of performing a public task. 
It was decided that the police should appoint one or more officers, called con-
stables responsible for order to assist the organisers of high-risk sports events. 
These officers should supervise on the scene how the event is organised and 
conducted, whether the security regulations are observed and may initiate, if 
necessary, the intervention of the police forces. They thought the police had to 
be authorised by law to declare an event finished, take out and remove ringlead-
ers, or if this is not feasible, to dissolve the crowd, provided that the behaviour 
of those present endangers the safety of the event and order cannot be restored 
in any other way. His research led József Végh to the conclusion in 2001 that it 
was very important that plain-clothes police officers should join fans’ groups. 
He wrote that each officer should meet the same group of fans, since personal 
acquaintance and relationship, through which the fans will definitely consider 
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the officers their partners, is more efficient than any squad operation for crowd 
management. With the help of this constant relationship between a well-pre-
pared police officer with good communication skills and a group of fans, the 
police command can be informed about the planned events. In Germany, too, it 
helped a lot with managing football hooliganism that this kind of work became 
the main sphere of activities of some experts (Végh, 2001, 47.). Today plain-
clothes police officers wearing Partner Group waistcoats play an active role in 
securing sports events in Hungary. At sports activities posing a security risk they 
also apply dialogue-based crowd management, laying great emphasis on com-
munication and defusing volatile situations. The members of the Partner Group 
are clearly distinguishable from high-profile police. (The Group had their debut 
at the Romania – Hungary soccer match, actually posing the greatest challenge 
to the police.) They work among the fans, wearing plain clothes, without hav-
ing weapons or coercive equipment. Their task is to mitigate tension, recognise 
crisis situations and manage them by verbal means. They do everything in order 
to have a peaceful solution by getting into and keeping in touch with fan clubs. 
The members of the Partner Group do not take measures. While working, they 
constantly maintain contact with the chiefs of the operation units. They active-
ly monitor the spectators, notify their colleagues, who are deployed to provide 
security, about more significant disorders and provide information for the fans 
about escape routes and the order of transportation. They aim is establishing a 
situation that requires the smallest amount of active police intervention. They 
place emphasis on the prevention rather than the solution of problems and try 
to keep up the dialogue with the fans. Order No. 8/2010. (OT 5.) of the Nation-
al Police Headquarters on the qualification and policing of sports events names 
the earlier mentioned, appointed police officers as spotters within the organisa-
tional structure of the Hungarian Police Force. According to this order, spotters, 
i.e. officers appointed to liaise with sports organisations and to carry out and 
coordinate security-related policing tasks must be involved in the preparations 
and execution of securing the safety of sports events. Spotters are professional 
members of the police staff, deployed at the various sports teams and organi-
sations. They are selected from their own staff by the head of the territorially 
competent police headquarters. The key selection criteria are situational aware-
ness, good communication skills and love for the given sport. A spotter must 
know everything about the team. He must know its members the fan groups 
and it may also be important to have or to establish a relationship of trust with 
them (Keller, 2016, 16.).
In his Report, mentioned earlier, Taylor also defines the role and line of re-
sponsibility of the police and of the organisers, including the bearing of the 
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costs. Firstly, he discusses whether the terraces should be monitored by the po-
lice or the club via its stewards. He refers to the Green Guide (issued in 1986), 
according to which it is basically the responsibility of the home club, i.e. the 
one that invites the audience to its premises to secure safety at the event. More 
exactly, both in normal and in emergency situations, safety of the public inside 
the ground is the responsibility of its management. He lists the five basic du-
ties of the stewards, such as:
• controlling or directing the spectators when entering or leaving the stadium 
to make sure that there is an even flow of people and that they are safely 
dispersed on the terraces;
• patrolling the premises and managing emergencies (e.g. fires) that occur;
• supervising important points such as entrances and especially exits and 
gates that are open during the event;
• helping the police staff with crowd management when needed;
• carrying out specific duties in cases of emergency.
Taylor refers to the public inquiry made by Justice Popplewell in 1985 and the 
interim report based on it and another report produced for the Minister of Hous-
ing and Local Government in 1969, according to which crowd control respon-
sibilities should be split between the police and the club operating the ground. 
However, it says that the police should be responsible for the movement of 
spectators through the entrances and from the entrances into the ground, and 
the club is responsible for the control of spectators inside the club’s premises. 
Justice Popplewell says that in practice the physical safety of the premises is 
the responsibility of the club, whereas the police usually take care of manag-
ing the crowd during the game. For example, if the ground has to be evacuat-
ed, the police should organise and supervise the procedure. In his Final Report, 
Popplewell explains that this practice has developed as the police officers have 
regularly attended football grounds in large numbers and thus the clubs have 
assumed that the control of what happens inside the ground has passed to the 
police from them. He, however, emphasizes that it is mainly the responsibility 
and duty of the club or of the occupier of the ground as the organiser of a pri-
vate event to ensure reasonable safety for those who are invited and the task of 
the police is merely to assist in the enforcement of law and order. Yet, the club 
may need to  ̒employ the police to act as their agents in certain circumstances’ 
and may actually be authorised to do so, which involves paying them to attend 
and prevent the sections from overcrowding. At the same time Popplewell ac-
knowledges that this is a grey area of responsibility, which needs to be reviewed. 
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Taylor goes on to define several elements within the monitoring of the terraces, 
such as the phase when the spectators enter, when they are placed, when they 
move within the ground and when they leave it, i.e. exit from it. He also con-
firms that the club has the legal duty to take reasonable care for the safety of 
those invited to the ground but specifies two practical reasons why the clubs 
are tempted to make the police be in charge (Final Report, 1990, 35.). One is 
that the clubs carry out their duties through stewards, who are often support-
ers themselves, often inexperienced and physically not fit enough to deal with 
unruly customers, are underpaid and not always committed to the task. The 
police, however (and this is the second reason), have the duty to maintain law 
and order in public areas outside the stadium. They are trained and, thanks to 
their uniform, have the respect of the majority of spectators, who fear the law, 
thus they have far more authority than the stewards do. Therefore, and also 
because they have the control room, the CCTV, a communications system to 
co-ordinate deployed officers around the ground and reserves at their disposal, 
whenever there is misbehaviour or disorder, the police will inevitably be called 
to take control. Taylor quotes a submission from the Association of Chief Po-
lice Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO), which says that 
̒dual responsibility for safety is a recipe for confusion’. Since the police will 
always seize the initiative in a crisis, will never accept direction from stewards 
and stewarding will never be able to cope without some law enforcement back-
up, the police should have prime responsibility for controlling the crowd. Tay-
lor also notes that clubs are tempted to leave it all to the police if they are not 
required to make realistic payment for police services. He describes the con-
temporary practice, according to which recovering costs of policing inside the 
grounds varied greatly from place to place. It either involved the actual cost of 
the officers attending the stadium or depended on the risk category or the size 
of the crowd involved, or, in certain cases was entirely arbitrary. Taylor sug-
gests that it would be more economical to recruit fully trained (with the help of 
the police), efficient, fit and active stewards or hire security firms to man gates, 
direct spectators to the correct areas and to their seats, keep gangways clear, 
monitor the density of packing in pens or enclosures. This way they could re-
duce the number of police deployed, whose authority would mainly be needed 
at high-risk matches. He also proposes that the clubs and the local police force 
should have a written statement of intent, setting out their respective functions 
for crowd control (Final Report, 1990, 37.). Taylor thinks that the definition of 
the tasks of police commanders is also of major importance, since the ultimate 
control of any match lies with them. They must decide on the number and po-
sitions of the officers deployed, whether or not to postpone kick-off, stop the 
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match, evacuate the ground or any area of it. Whereas experienced commanders 
have the necessary skills and special knowledge of the problems at their par-
ticular ground, new commanders must be trained for such functions at specific 
courses where they could also pool experience and find solutions to common 
problems (Final Report, 1990, 38.). Going back to Hungary, it is an interest-
ing fact that according to the 1948 regulation issued by the Ministry of Inte-
rior nobody was allowed to be in the field during the game, apart from the 22 
players, the referee and the linesmen. Only the representatives of the football 
associations, one doctor, one trainer per team and the reserves (at international 
matches) were allowed to sit on the inner side of the barrier that separated the 
field from the spectators. It was the duty of the referee to punish the breach of 
discipline and to remove unruly players from the field. The referee was obliged 
to carry out all the orders of the police officer-on-duty appointed to the match 
concerning the maintenance of order, precisely, without any comments, other-
wise the officer-on-duty was authorised to stop the match immediately. Taylor, 
too, thought that policing activities should be carried out in a reliable way, based 
on collected intelligence and appropriate risk analysis, applying the most opti-
mal number of staff. He suggested that the police and the clubs should split the 
costs of securing safety. Higher levels of order meant saving significant sums 
of money in terms of the number of police staff. While in the mid-1980s there 
were 74 supporters per one police officer, from 2003 the ratio was halved with 
161 supporters per one police officer. According to Hungarian police statistics, 
today at a high-risk soccer match with 5.000 spectators there are usually 171 
police officers and a 100-strong private security team. Taylor viewed securing 
safety as a complex system with prevention being primary. He reviewed the 
whole philosophy of security from selling tickets to the visiting team returning 
home. His report established that the police had prime responsibility for the 
Hillsborough tragedy. In accordance with Taylor’s suggestions and the regula-
tions defined by the Council of Europe, UEFA supported the transformation of 
stadiums into all-seated grounds for its system of competitions. 
This was one of the 76 recommendations Taylor formulated for the sake of more 
secure sports events. The most important ones of these concerned the following:
Advisory Design Council
National Inspectorate and Review Body
Maximum Capacities for Terraces









Green Guide (Ibid. Final Report, 1990, 76-82).
In his Report, Taylor devotes a separate chapter to police planning and control 
and the provision of an appropriate and efficient police control room. While he 
acknowledges the activities of the police in maintaining order at sports events 
and especially in and outside football stadiums and praises the police staff for 
their invaluable work, being subjected to abuse and having no thanks for the 
service they provide every week, he underlines the responsibility of some sen-
ior officers in what happened at Hillsborough. He admits that it is human fact 
for the officers to react to the stress and provocation they have to endure and 
that in the confusion of a crowded scene requiring firm police action it is diffi-
cult to select the innocents and free them from the measures taken. Therefore, 
it is very important to have high-standard police discipline and self-control and 
friendly relations with supporters. Also, firm control should be balanced with 
good humour and patience. The police officers should be trained to recognise 
crowd density and signs of distress and should take immediate measures if nec-
essary. A chief officer from each police force should be nominated to liaise with 
the management of each football club concerned. Planning should involve pro-
viding sufficient reserves to enable rapid deployment of officers to be made at 
any point inside or outside the ground. Arrest procedures should be optimised 
so that an arresting officer will not be away from his post for long. The option 
to postpone kick-off should be in the discretion of the officer in command at 
the ground. In the Police Control Room, which should be inside the ground, the 
results of all closed circuit television monitoring outside and inside the ground 
and the record of numbers admitted to any area of the ground should be availa-
ble and the officers in the control room should interpret these data. These rooms 
should be well placed, with a good view of the whole pitch and the spectator 
areas, of sufficient size and well equipped with radios, telephones, and CCTV 
screens. There should be room for the Commander, his deputy and enough of-
ficers to operate the equipment, as well as others who may need to visit the 
room from time to time (other senior officers, club management or a member 
of the emergency services) (Final Report, 1990, 42.). Command points also 
help police work significantly in Hungary today. Several stadiums have mod-
ern command points, the one in Groupama Arena being the most up-to-date, 
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equipped with 200 high-definition cameras and 3 mobile cameras to assist the 
police. We should also mention the development of the new Puskás Ferenc Sta-
dium under construction, where the designs for the security system were made 
following the German pattern. In this facility, too, there will be an independent 
command point with a detention room and interview rooms. In fact, there will 
be a miniature police station having the latest technological equipment (Tóth, 
2018, 632.). Taylor also thought it was important to enumerate the measures 
to be taken in order to avoid congestion and panic. In his Report, he calls the 
attention to the risk of congestion outside turnstiles and consequent injuries or 
disorder, especially if there is only a limited number of turnstiles and because 
a large proportion of the crowd usually arrives late, during the last 20 minutes 
before kick-off. This leads to the building up of queues, followed by anxiety 
among those waiting, who fear they will not get in for the kick-off. Crowd noise 
from the ground, when the teams are out, increases impatience. There is also a 
real danger of pressure towards the turnstiles causing injuries and panic result-
ing in disorder. Taylor points out that since the national membership scheme 
has been introduced, all spectators passing through the turnstiles must produce 
their membership cards for checking, for which some additional time should 
be allocated. The Statement of Requirements (SOR) for the national member-
ship scheme also provides that the six basic checks should add no more than 1 
second to each entry. Whether this can be achieved even in unfavourable condi-
tions depends on the procedures at the turnstiles and on the technology applied.
The process at the turnstile may be delayed if, for example, the card has expired. 
In this case the card has to be retained and the turnstile operator is required to 
make out and give the holder a receipt for it (containing either the membership 
number or some other method to identify the retained card later) and explain 
the procedure for redeeming the card later.
Other cases in which the process is delayed are:
• if the turnstile alarm alerts the operator to a banned, lost or stolen card or 
pass-back, in which case the suspect is to be apprehended by the police;
• if there is no card or the card is presented at the wrong turnstile – in this 
case the spectator is turned back from the entry point.
Discussing technology, Taylor underlines that the required computerised system 
will be the first of its kind (let us not forget that the Report was presented in 
1990). It will need to cope with the massive numbers of people, in a short peri-
od of time and in all types of weather conditions, therefore he suggests that great 
caution and a very extensive testing procedure should be applied. He refers to 
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the Football Identity Card Scheme in the Netherlands, which involved only five 
clubs with a bad history of hooliganism and applied only to the away matches 
of those clubs. The scheme failed; ticket sales were not controlled effectively, 
and away supporters were admitted without tickets. Also, the clubs were hostile 
to the scheme and those opposing the experiment joined their forces. Taylor, 
however, thinks that this failure should not deter those backing the implemen-
tation of a totally different scheme proposed in the 1989 Football Spectators Act. 
Using the lesson learnt from the Dutch example, the British scheme should be 
built on smart cards that can store a lot of relevant information and that show 
(when the holder passes it over a reader) whether the card is valid, doubtful or 
invalid. Taylor says he was impressed by the demonstration of the smart card 
but expresses his doubts whether the system is going to work with multiple turn-
stiles, among adverse weather conditions, with a large national referral database 
to be searched and with people trying to circumvent or wreck the system. He 
also quotes the concerns of the ACPO as regards the efficiency and reliability 
of the technology. The technophobia of those expressing disbelief about com-
puter systems ( ̒All our experience to date has been that computer salesmen have 
offered much and delivered little.’) today may even seem amusing but at the 
time with even thoroughly tested computers frequently going down at airports, 
causing delays at check-in, computer errors in banks, etc. those fears were real-
istic and the police were right when they felt that they had to  ̒be involved in the 
specification for any technology and would need to be satisfied that it works 
before support could be given to this scheme.’ They were justly afraid of the 
consequences of repeated failure, hostile queues and endless delays. Taylor also 
emphasizes that the scheme could cause very dangerous build-ups, but the solu-
tion in the London Underground, where they had to provide manned entrance 
channels alongside the computerised ones, would not work in football grounds, 
because the main point of the system is to exclude hooligans by computer check-
ing (Final Report, 1990, 67.). By now the system of membership cards have be-
come reality. It goes without saying that the organisers of high-risk sports events 
may apply an access control system when selling club cards, season passes or 
entrance tickets and may check the identity of the spectator against the data of 
this system on entry. Club cards and football cards have been introduced in Hun-
gary, too. Club cards are linked to associations. Football cards are a special type 
of club cards, issued by the Hungarian Football Federation for those who are 
not linked to any clubs and mainly attend the matches of national teams. Taylor 
emphasized the importance of club or membership cards already in 1989. He 
states that it must have the member’s photograph, name, full membership num-
ber, the expiry date, the name of the club he belongs to and the membership 
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number in a machine readable form to allow rapid matching of the card against 
the national referral file (Final Report, 1990, 63.). According to the Sport Act, 
in Hungary the legal basis for data processing is provided by the consent of the 
holder of the membership card. The processed data are the name and the place 
and date of birth. The management of the home address is only necessary if the 
spectator is refused by the organiser. The identity of the spectator can be checked 
before the purchase of the ticket and on entry. It is an interesting fact that the 
legislation does not differentiate between ordinary and VIP tickets, which may 
lead to a number of problems. Disorderly fans at sports events can be subject to 
criminal prosecution or infringement proceedings. Exclusion from the stadium 
because of offences related to attending sports events may be applied as a sec-
ondary or an independent measure. The spectators’ visits to sports events were 
regulated in detail already in the ancient times. The tool of exclusion from the 
grounds was also applied by the Romans but the range of those concerned was 
defined in a broader sense than today, since people were banned from watching 
the games not only for law enforcement reasons but also on grounds of public 
morality. Today tickets must not be sold to people in the sports policing records 
who are therefore excluded, prohibited or banished from the events, and thus 
they must not be admitted to them. A club card is a certificate endorsed with a 
photograph, suitable for the identification of a spectator, also entitling him to 
benefits. Personal identities may also be checked by way of biometric means. 
Personal data may only be used in the case of criminal procedures or infringe-
ment proceedings initiated in relation to a sports event or in the case of an ex-
clusion from sports events. Taylor also underlines the importance of exclusion. 
He states that it could be enforced by two additional measures, namely attend-
ance centre order (the offender must attend at an appointed centre on the occa-
sions of designated football matches) and those refusing it would be liable to 
further penalties, including imprisonment. The rationale behind it is that mere-
ly banning someone from the matches does not ban their presence near the ground. 
Taylor refers to a similar provision in Part II of the 1989 Football Spectators Act 
relating to foreign matches and section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, 
which empowers courts to make attendance centre orders for young people un-
der 21, with a minimum length of 12 hours and a maximum of 24 and 36 hours 
for persons under 17 and between 17 and 20 respectively (Final Report, 1990, 
55.). We can undoubtedly state that Hungary is a sporting nation. We organise 
a large number of national and international sports competitions. In 2017 the 
police were involved in securing the safety of about 1800 sports events. The or-
ganisation of conducting sports events is a very complex task, especially in the 
case of larger or international ones. The number of such events is growing every 
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year, while securing safety has become one of the most important aspects of their 
management. Security measures at the same time must be implemented in such 
a way that the public and the supporters should not be discouraged from attend-
ing these sports events, since football, for example, provides a sports experience 
and excitement for the supporters. Fans usually identify themselves with the 
positive social, sports and historical content represented by their team, which is 
clearly manifested in the fans’ chants, too. Many supporters are given the op-
portunity to assume a role that they cannot typically have in everyday life. At a 
match a fan may become a leader; he can undergo the experience of having pow-
er and feel dominant. Many supporters view the world as a system of complex 
relations but during a match they can create a world reflecting more transparent 
relationships. Whether their team win or lose, they can easily have a sense of 
achievement. They often try to create chaos so that it will be followed by a kind 
of new order, where they can behave according to different rules (Végh, 2001, 
40.). In 2011 a representative public-opinion poll was conducted in Hungary, 
focussing on the factors that prevent people from visiting matches. One of the 
most frequent answers was that people did not consider stadiums safe enough. 
In the questionnaire-based research I conducted in 2018 I sought answers to ex-
actly the same questions. I presented the findings in a monograph in my publi-
cation of 2019 (Tóth, 2019, 63-67.).
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